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GLOBSEC Policy Briefs con-
tribute to debates held at the 
Forum with original ideas and 
concrete policy recommen-
dations. Their aim is to provide 
critical assessment of issues dis-
cussed and food for thought 
for GLOBSEC participants.
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The Central European Policy 
Institute is a new regional think-
tank established in Bratislava 
in 2012 by the Slovak Atlan-
tic Commission. It links top re-
search institutions and experts 
from across Central Europe. 
CEPI is devoted to improving 
the quality of the region’s con-
tributions to the EU and NATO 
debates on key challenges of 
today. We believe that Cen-
tral Europe should take on 
more responsibility in the EU 
and NATO for issues ranging 
from the economic crisis to 
energy and security.
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EUroPE‘S SECUrIty
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• Central Europeans get nervous 
when the US tinkers with its mili-
tary bases in Europe. They regard 
the installations as a symbol of US 
commitment to their defence, 
and study each shift for signs that 
Washington’s resolution is wan-
ing. The US has not always han-
dled this sensitivity well: when the 
Obama administration scrapped 
the Bush-era blueprint for mis-
sile defence bases in Europe, it 
broke the news on the anniver-
sary of the 1939 Soviet invasion of 
Poland.
• The US Department of Defence 
announced another change to 
missile defence plans in March. 
Alarmed headlines duly followed 
in Central Europe. But the 2013 
decision should leave the region 
at ease; Washington is not rethink-
ing its obligation to its defence.
• Instead of worrying about US 
bases, the Central Europeans 
should be seeking to capitalise on 
another, less heralded change: 
while Washington continues to re-
gard Asia and the Middle East as 
its top foreign policy priorities, it 
has launched a quiet effort to im-
prove relations with Europe and 
deepen trade ties with it.
• Central Europe should re-
spond by reinvigorating security 
dialogue with the United States. 
And it should use its collective in-
fluence to press for a new trans-
atlantic trade and investment 
partnership.
Launch failure
The gist of the recent missile de-
fence decision is that the US will 
not deploy advanced SM-3 IIB 
interceptors in Poland, as it origi-
nally planned to do in 2022, in the 
last phase of the programme. The 
missiles in question have yet to be 
built, the technology involved is 
tricky, and a recent Congression-
al study has concluded that they 
may never work as intended. The 
US has decided that its money is 
better used putting more old-style 
interceptors in Alaska, to protect 
against a possible attack from 
North Korea (which has success-
fully tested a long-range rocket 
and a nuclear warhead in the 
past six months). 
The plans to develop SM-3 IIB in-
terceptors were a thorn in Russia’s 
side: in theory, they would have 
been capable of destroying Rus-
sia’s intercontinental missiles in 
flight. Some in Central Europe in-
terpret their cancellation as an 
opening act in another US push 
to jointly cut nuclear arsenals 
with Russia. They also read the 
move as a sign that the US cares 
less and less about the security of 
Europe as Washington’s attention 
shifts to Asia and the Middle East.
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Those concerns appear to have little merit. US officials 
say that while Washington would love to reduce nuclear 
arms jointly with Russia, Vladimir Putin is not interested. 
Relations are in deep freeze, one White House official 
says, and the US has given up trying, for now. The SM-3 
IIBs were cut not because Moscow demanded so, but 
because they were costly and they might never fly.
Importantly for Central Europe, Washington is sticking 
by plans to base simpler interceptors in Poland and Ro-
mania, despite Russian protests. The US has not compro-
mised on the principle that Russia should have no say 
over new western military bases in the region. The deci-
sion to cancel the last phase of missile defences will thus 
have minimal impact on Central European security. Nor 
is Europe as such any more vulnerable to rocket strikes 
than before: the SM-3 IIBs were meant to intercept mis-
siles flying to the US, not to Europe.
Meanwhile in Washington...
While Central Europeans fret about missile defences, 
they risk missing an important change on another front: 
Washington seems to be making a push to deepen ties 
with Europe, particularly on trade. This marks an adjust-
ment of sorts to the Europe policy in the first four years of 
Barack Obama’s administration.
In the president’s first term, the US policy to Europe was 
one of tough love; the goal was to encourage allies on 
the continent, new and old, to assume more responsibil-
ity for security and defence of Europe.
US government officials took to warning allies to spend 
more on defence or face NATO’s demise. In Libya, the 
US – for the first time in NATO’s history – delegated the 
command (to Britain and France), while providing help 
in the background. From now on, Washington signalled, 
the US will take the lead only in case of the direst of 
conflicts in and near Europe. To drive the point home 
– and to better cope with budget cuts – the Pentagon 
has begun reducing forces in Europe: of its four ‘brigade 
combat teams’ one has been withdrawn already; an-
other is being disbanded ahead of schedule. The US Air 
Force is also closing bases in Germany and Italy; in total 
US force numbers in Europe will drop from 80,000 to be-
low 70,000 in the next two to three years (see table be-
low). Besides getting the allies to do more for their own 
defence, ‘tough love’ policy also served to signal that 
the US military was serious about focusing on Asia-Pacific 
and, to lesser extent, the Middle East, rather than Europe 
(though the Pentagon is putting few new forces in Asia 
while reducing its presence in Afghanistan – the ‘pivot’ 
to the Pacific looks more like a cut than a change in 
posture).
The impact on the Central European allies has been 
two-fold: like their ‘older’ NATO counterparts, they face 
the need to spend more money and contribute more 
forces in the future to manage crises on or near Europe’s 
borders, to make up for decreasing US interest in such 
missions. They may receive less US help in training troops 
as the Pentagon cuts assistance budgets and force 
numbers (including trainers) in Europe. Unlike their West 
European counterparts, most of who worry little about 
also conventional threats to their borders, the Central 
Europeans will now also wonder: can NATO, with fewer 
US forces in Europe, repel an invader? Can such dimin-
ished NATO deter enemies in the first place? The United 
States has taken ‘reassurance’ measures in Central Eu-
rope – such as deploying an air wing in Poland – to al-
Planned US military force cuts in Europe
Unit Location Expected date of closure Number of troops / equipment
81st Fighter Squadron
Spangdahlem Air  
Base, DE
2013
20 aircraft (A-10) + 
personnel
603rd Air Control Squadron Aviano Air Base, IT 2013 Not known
V Corps Headquarters Heidelberg, DE 2012 Not known
170th Brigade Combat Team Baumholder, DE
2012 (deactivated
October 9th 2012)
4,500 troops
172nd Brigade Combat Team Grafenwöhr, DE 2014 4,000 troops
Misc. enabling units (Army) Various places 2017 2,500 troops
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lay fears that it no longer cares about new allies’ safety. 
The US has also pushed NATO to produce contingency 
plans for the defence of the Baltic countries, and in the 
autumn of 2013 the alliance will hold its largest military 
exercise in years in Central Europe.
These steps have reduced but not eliminated new allies’ 
concerns: US force numbers continue to drop, so help 
from the largest ally, if ever needed, will be smaller and 
arrive later than before.
While the broad contours of US policy remain in place, the 
administration’s tone towards Europe appears to have 
changed in the second term. The US seems to have con-
cluded that it had little to gain from giving Europe a cold 
shoulder; that it can have an Asia-centric outlook and 
still be nice to old friends. US officials also speak of new-
found appreciation for their allies, because they have 
taken the initiative in Libya and Mali. Vice-president Joe 
Biden chose to stress long-standing ties to Europe, rather 
than low defence budgets or new threats in the Pacific, 
in his first post-election speech (at the Munich security 
conference in February 2013). Hillary Clinton’s depar-
ture, along with her chief for Asian affairs, Kurt Campbell, 
may be partly behind the change of tone: they were 
the driving forces behind the US foreign policy’s pivot to 
Asia. The new secretaries of state and defence, John 
Kerry and Chuck Hagel, are both from the generation of 
politicians for whom NATO was America’s key alliance 
and the security of Europe the top priority. They may well 
be the last leaders from this generation. 
The key plank of this newer, nicer Europe policy is the 
‘transatlantic trade and investment partnership’ (TTIP), 
which Joe Biden said the US would like to sign with the 
EU as soon as possible. This would remove the remaining 
tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to trade; both sides ex-
pect it to lift their economies: the White House estimates 
that TTIP will add tens of billions of dollars to the two sides’ 
GDPs. Should they succeed to mesh their economies, the 
US and the EU will create such large trading block that 
it will de facto dictate global standards in areas such as 
food or car safety, leaving Asian and other manufactur-
ers with little choice but to comply. TTIP could become 
one of the West’s best tools to retain economic domi-
nance as China and other non-Western powers rise.
What now?
The challenge for Central Europe during the first, ‘tough 
love’ term of president Obama was to keep the US en-
gaged in Europe without appearing to be complain-
ing, and to show that the new allies take seriously the 
need to do more for European defence. Poland did 
this reasonably well: it has invested heavily in defence 
and negotiated new US bases on its territory (though 
the country’s abstention from – and its prime minister’s 
criticism of – the war in Libya irked the US, not to men-
tion Britain and France, who led the operation). Warsaw 
also complemented the policy by rebuilding defence 
ties with EU countries, to give itself more options in time 
of a crisis. Other Central Europeans have done less well: 
one cannot credibly complain about US inattention 
while slashing defence budgets. In general, Central Eu-
rope’s policy during Obama’s first term was one of dam-
age control: US-European relationship was weakening, 
and the goal was to limit the pace and breadth of this 
disengagement.
The challenge in the second term will be to try to nourish 
the fledgling attempts to re-engage: to make the new US 
policy a success, thus reassuring the Americans that Eu-
rope cares about the relationship and appreciates their 
efforts to patch it up. This will be trickier than it sounds. 
By making TTIP the centrepiece of its Europe policy, 
and by pressing for quick progress, the US risks appear-
ing snubbed if talks get bogged down. And they prob-
ably will: the US and many European countries, including 
some newer member-states, disagree on sensitive issues 
such as genetically-modified foods. Other elements of 
Europe policy such as military-to-military co-operation 
could suffer if TTIP fails to materialise, as those in Wash-
ington who press for re-engagement lose credibility.
In broad terms, Central Europe’s policy should consist of 
encouraging improvement in transatlantic relations, and 
seeking to capitalise on it. In practice, this translates to 
a two-pronged approach: one, countries in the region 
should do their utmost to liberalise trade within Europe 
and with the US, so as to help TTIP talks to succeed, or to 
generate at least partial successes should negotiations 
fail. Central European countries ought to take advan-
tage of their forthcoming role as holders of the EU’s rotat-
ing presidencies (Lithuania and Latvia in 2013 and 2015 
respectively; Slovakia in 2016) to keep TTIP high on the 
European agenda. The European Commission will lead 
the talks, but the presidencies can help by generating 
pressure on hesitant European capitals to make neces-
sary compromises. The three countries soon to preside 
over the EU should produce joint TTIP advocacy strategy, 
perhaps with Poland’s help. A common Central Europe-
an statement of endorsement of TTIP could also help.
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Second, Central Europe should seek to deepen the stra-
tegic discussions with the US about European security, 
taking advantage of Washington’s renewed interest in 
being nicer to its allies. A serious debate with Washington 
on the risks to Europe is Central Europe’s long-term prior-
ity (because it keeps the US government thinking of its 
obligations here), but such conversations have proven 
difficult during President Obama’s first term. 
There are several practical steps that the Central Euro-
peans can take in order to deepen the strategic dia-
logue with the US:
•  New allies should improve the way they spend their 
defence money. Cuts to defence budgets have 
harmed their reputation in Washington, and their 
ability to call US attention to Central Europe’s secu-
rity worries. The overall budgets could take a while 
to recover because of the economic crisis. But some 
Central Europeans also spend their defence money 
poorly, devoting far too much to personnel and not 
enough to modernisation. Those countries that have 
room for improvement should start restructuring their 
armed forces in such way as to free up more money 
for military research and procurement;
•  The Visegrad states need to make good on their 
vow to deepen defence collaboration. The V4 have 
made some progress; among other things they have 
agreed to field a joint EU ‘battlegroup’. But they have 
shied away so far from buying weapons jointly or in-
tegrating units or merging defence companies. They 
should try harder: willingness to seek efficiencies in 
collaboration has become an important measure 
of whether allies take NATO (or EU defence, for that 
matter) seriously.
•  Central Europeans should take the lead in providing 
security in the Balkans. Neither Bosnia-Herzegovina 
nor Kosovo can do without foreign security presence 
for now. The US has already dramatically reduced 
forces in the region, and wishes to delegate even 
more responsibility there to its allies. The biggest West 
European countries are rightly focused elsewhere, 
on North Africa and the Middle East. By agreeing to 
take leadership in the Balkans – to provide the bulk of 
the troops and police, to take more prominent role in 
commanding military and security operations and in 
diplomacy – the Central Europeans free up the US to 
focus their resources elsewhere. This is politically im-
portant. Few European countries can send meaning-
ful forces to Asia-Pacific, where US security priorities 
lie. But unless the allies demonstrate that they can be 
useful to the US in other ways, Washington will lose in-
terest in NATO. To keep the US engaged, the Europe-
ans need to increase contribution to security of parts 
of the world other than the Pacific, and Central Eu-
rope is uniquely prepared to do so in the Balkans (it 
already plays a leading diplomatic role vis-à-vis East 
European countries such as Ukraine and Belarus);
•  Central European diplomats should tighten coordi-
nation in NATO and in Washington. The White House 
and State Department teams responsible for Europe 
are being replaced; the Central Europeans have an 
opportunity to engage the new officials early, and to 
explore with them what can be done to improve NA-
TO’s and the EU’s ability to understand and respond 
to challenges in Central Europe and on NATO’s east-
ern and northern borders. Think-tanks such as CEPI 
and its partners in Central Europe and the US can be 
helpful in generating ideas and convening discussions 
involving top officials from both sides of the Atlantic. 
Central Europe’s conversation in Washington should 
increasingly take place via the EU, which has a great-
er clout than Visegrad or other regional groupings. 
This also requires that the Central European countries 
play a more active role in the EU’s new external ac-
tion service than they have so far.
There may well be other good ways to encourage the US 
and Europe to deepen trade ties and security dialogue. 
Central Europe’s emphasis should be on exploring addi-
tional such avenues and using them to the fullest. The re-
cent missile defence decision is a red herring: it changes 
little in the region, and says little about Washington’s Eu-
rope policy. The far more important story to follow is that 
of new opportunities that Washington’s kinder, gentler 
transatlantic policy represents for Central Europe.
Slovak Atlantic Commission  |  Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609
sac@ata-sac.org | www.ata-sac.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
2013
Jan Jireš is Director of the Prague Centre for Transatlantic Relations of the CEVRO Institute.
Wojciech Lorenz is Senior Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs.
Peter Rada is President of the Corvinus Society for Foreign Affairs and Culture in Budapest.
Tomáš Valášek is President of the Central European Policy Institute in Bratislava.
The paper was prepared within the framework of the VPB series. The VPB project is organized jointly by CD Inter-
national and the Central European Policy Institute in cooperation with the Polish Institute of International Affairs, 
the International Centre for Democratic Transition and Jagello 2000. It is co-financed by the International Visegrad 
Fund.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their em-
ployers or of the publisher. © CEPI, 2013
iFor more see: Jan Havránek, Jan Jireš and Milan Šuplata, ‘Maintaning defence capabilities: European share’, CEPI policybrief, March 7th 2013.
